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Abstract
After being trained, classifiers must often operate on data that has been corrupted by noise. In this paper, we consider the impact
of such noise on the features of binary classifiers. Inspired by tools for classifier robustness, we introduce the same classification
probability (SCP) to measure the resulting distortion on the classifier outputs. We introduce a low-complexity estimate of the
SCP based on quantization and polynomial multiplication. We also study channel coding techniques based on replication error-
correcting codes. In contrast to the traditional channel coding approach, where error-correction is meant to preserve the data and
is agnostic to the application, our schemes specifically aim to maximize the SCP (equivalently minimizing the distortion of the
classifier output) for the same redundancy overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Noise is an enduring component of all computing and communication systems. Information is corrupted when transmitted
over noisy channels [1], stored in unreliable memories [2], or processed by noisy or low-quality circuits [3]. Moreover,
techniques aimed at saving power or increasing efficiency can increase noise. For example, voltage scaling further increases
the probability of data corruption [4]. The traditional approach to handling noisy storage media is to implement strategies to
detect and correct errors. For example, many memories and drives implement error-correcting codes [5].
The typical policy of such systems is to ensure that information read back is the same as it was when written. Such a
policy represents a very strong constraint; implementations tend to be expensive, with significant storage overhead dedicated
to redundant data. In this paper, we ask whether we may relax this constraint in the context of feature data for classifiers. Our
goal is to reduce the effect of noise on the output of the algorithm; in other words, we consider the distortion of the algorithm
outputs, rather than the inputs.
The basic setup is shown in Figure 1. We have a naı¨ve Bayes classifier with class variable C and binary features X1,X2, . . . ,Xn.
Learning is performed on noiseless training data. Afterwards, the classifier operates on noisy data; rather than the true features
X1, . . . ,Xn, only the corrupted features X′1,X′2, . . . ,X′n are used. Feature Xi’s value is flipped from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0 with
probability i. A fundamental question is to determine the same classification probability (SCP), that is, the probability that
the classifier output is the same for X1, . . . ,Xn and for X′1, . . . ,X′n.
Features can be protected by using an error-correction strategy. A set of redundant bits is computed when the data is written;
before the data is used, both the data and redundant bits are decoded, with the goal of correcting some of the errors. This
procedure is known as channel coding. The traditional approach is to protect all bits equally, uniformly reducing the is for all
n features. As we will see, this is not an efficient approach. Some features are more valuable and more worthy of protection
than others. In fact, given a budget of redundancy, our major goal is an optimal resulting set of 1, . . . ,n to minimize the
classifier distortion.
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Fig. 1. Noisy classifier process model. The noiseless classification uses the features X1 ,X2 , . . . ,Xn. Noisy feature X′i is produced from Xi with the binary
symmetric channel BSC(i): X′i is equal to Xi with probability 1−i and equal to X¯i with probability i . Classification is performed on the noisy features
X′1 , . . . ,X′n, without observing the true values X1 , . . . ,Xn.
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2TABLE I
SCPS FOR VARIOUS REDUNDANCY ALLOCATIONS
Parameters SCP by protection strategy
p0(x1) p0(x2) p1(x1) p1(x2) Uniform None All x1 All x2
0.9 0.89 0.1 0.11 0.963 0.900 0.991 0.900
0.8 0.81 0.3 0.3 0.964 0.905 0.946 0.946
We illustrate this idea with a simple example. Take a classifier with n = 2 features X1,X2, noisy versions X′1,X′2, and
uniform prior. The noise parameter for both binary symmetric channels (BSCs) is  = 0.1 by default. Let pi(x j) denote
the conditional probability p(x j = 0|C = i). We show how the SCP varies for different values of the pi(x j)’s and noise
parameters. We also demonstrate how protecting features uniformly or non-uniformly affects the SCP. “Protection” refers to an
error-correction scheme that effectively reduces the  noise parameter for a particular feature. Here, we allocate 4 additional
redundancy bits for protection; uniform protection gives 2 such bits to each feature, while protection on Xi alone grants all
4 bits to Xi. (More precise definitions for this terminology are provided later on in the paper; the result of protection is a
reduction of the i noise parameter for feature i.)
In the first row of Table I, X1 contains more information about C compared to X2. Observe that allocating all bits to X1
yields a better SCP than equal protection or protection on X2. Conversely, if we look at the last row we see that even though
X2 contains more information about the class variable, the SCP is maximized by a uniform allocation of redundancy bits.
Thus we cannot simply examine the conditional probabilities to decide how to allocate redundancy. Such results motivate us
to seek an informed redundancy allocation strategy.
Our contributions are
• A framework for measuring the impact of noise by the same-classification probability (SCP),
• A low-complexity approximation for the SCP based on quantization and polynomial multiplication,
• A study of coding strategies based on allocating redundant bits in a way that minimizes the SCP (and thus the distortion
on the classifier output). We show that, surprisingly, the empirical SDP is non-monotonic with respect to error protection.
Afterwards, we give an optimization for optimal redundancy allocation based on a greedy approach.
II. PRIOR WORK
Channel coding for data protection is a vast field. Error-correction has been proposed for disk drives [6], write-once memories
[7], and for RAID architectures [8]. More recently, techniques have been developed to take advantage of the specific properties
of modern non-volatile memories such as flash [9], [10]. Distributed storage systems can be protected through replication or
erasure coding [11], [12]. Solid state drives can also benefit from sophisticated error-correction [13]. A common aspect of such
research, in contrast to our work, is that the goal is to preserve the data being stored without considering the application. That
is, error-correction is found in a different abstraction layer.
The research in [14] introduces an informed channel coding scheme for linear regression. Here, the error model was also
bit flips applied to a finite-width binary representations of integers. The goal was to minimize the distortion on the algorithm
outputs. An approximation scheme was introduced by considering the contribution to the distortion by a flip in a single bit
independently of the others.
There are a number of papers that have examined issues related to learning algorithms dealing with uncertainty. Recent work
on information dropout, a technique introduced in [15] to prevent neural networks from overfitting, has considered adding noise
to the activations of deep neural networks [16]; unlike our work, here noise is used during learning.
The robustness of various algorithms under noise exposure has been considered in a series of papers. [17] performed an
experimental study of algorithms when data sets were corrupted by synthetic noise. Deleted features were tackled in [18] and
[19]. [18], which is perhaps the most closely related work to the present paper, also considers corrupted features, and introduces
two techniques to tackle noise, one based on linear programming, and the other using an online batching scheme. However,
unlike our work, this paper considers only adversarial (not probabilistic) noise and does not propose optimized channel coding.
[19] uses a game-theoretic approach to avoid over-reliance on a feature that could be deleted. Another work tackling the case
of missing data in Bayes classifiers is [20].
Noise and coding are often important issues in distributed learning. For example, [21] introduced optimality guarantees for
distributed estimators in a setting where nodes can be isolated, but limited communication between them is allowed. [22]
considered problems including hypothesis testing and parameter estimation in the case of multiterminal algorithms where each
terminal has a data compression constraint.
A related area is known as value of information [23], [24]. The idea is to maximize an expected reward on some observed
features. One example is to observe those features that maximize the information gain [25].
Decision robustness in the case of hidden variables can be measured by the same decision probability (SDP) [26], [27]. SDP
has been applied to the evaluation of adaptive testing [28] and of mammography-based diagnosis [29] The same classification
probability we employ in this paper bears some similarity to the SDP. The problem of handling label noise is considered in
3[30]. Label noise in crowdsourcing is tackled through coding-theoretic means in [31]. Additionally, our work can be viewed
as a form of feature selection [32], although we do not remove features, but rather allow them to be noisier than certain more
critical features.
III. NOISE IN BINARY CLASSIFICATION
We use the standard notation of upper-case letters for random variables and lower-case letters for their instantiations. Boldface
denotes vectors of variables.
Throughout this paper we consider binary classification problems with binary features. For some test point x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
with n binary features, we denote the conditional probabilities by αi = p(xi|C = 0) and βi = p(xi|C = 1) for 1 6 i 6 n.
Throughout this paper, we employ a naı¨ve Bayes classifier such that x is classified to
c(x) = argmax
{
p(C = 0)
n
∏
i=1
αi , p(C = 1)
n
∏
i=1
βi .
}
Taking logarithms, x is classified according to to the value of
c(x) = sgn
(
log
p(C = 0)
p(C = 1)
+
n
∑
i=1
log(αi/βi)
)
. (1)
A. Impact of Noise
In this work, we employ a simple noise model: we define an noise parameter vector  = (1,2, . . . ,n) with 0 6 i < 1/2
for 1 6 i 6 n. The binary feature Xi is flipped to its opposite value X¯i with probability i and stays unchanged with probability
1−i. Using information theory terminology, we view this operation as placing a binary symmetric channel on each of the
features, as shown in Figure 1. We express the resulting error vector as E = (E1, E2, . . . , En), where Ei = 1 if an error has
occurred for feature i and 0 otherwise. As a special case, we consider the vector  = (,, . . . ,), where the error probability
is identical on all features. In this setting, the probability of some error instantiation e is a function of its Hamming weight
wt(e):
Pr(e) = wt(e)(1−)n−wt(e).
B. Same Classification Probability
Now we examine the effect of the feature bit errors on the output of the classification algorithm. Our goal is to determine
when noise does not impact the algorithm output. That is, we wish to compute the probability that the noiseless point X and
the noisy version X(E) = (x′1, . . . , x′n) have the same classification:
SCP(X, E) = Pr(c(X) = c(X(E))). (2)
We call this quantity the (real) same classification probability. We are mainly concerned with an empirical version of the SCP
for a feature realization x,
SCP(x, E) = ∑
e∈{0,1}n
Pr(c(x) = c(x(e)))Pr(e). (3)
The SCP resembles the same decision probability (SDP) introduced in [26], defined as the probability of producing a decision
(using evidence e) confirmed by Pr(d|e > T) as when some hidden variable H is revealed, ∑h Pr(d|e, h)Pr(h|e). A
key difference from SDP is that SCP considers two separate distributions: the augmented distribution that captures the data
generation process (Figure 1), and the original naı¨ve Bayes network where classification is performed. Instead, SDP is calculated
a single Bayesian classifier that is assumed to capture both processes.
If e j = 1 and thus there is a feature bit flip at position j, the corresponding term in (1) changes as
log
(
α j
β j
)
→ log
(
1−α j
1−β j
)
.
We denote A j := log
(
α j
β j
)
and B j := log
(
1−α j
1−β j
)
. Let us write D j for the difference
D j = B j − A j = log
(
1−α j
1−β j
)
− log
(
α j
β j
)
.
An error e j = 1 replaces A j in (1) with B j; equivalently, D j is added to this sum. Therefore, for some error vector e with `
errors given by the components ei1 , ei2 , . . . , ei` = 1, the noisy classification is given by
c(x(e)) = sgn
(
log
p(c = 0)
p(c = 1)
+
n
∑
i=1
Ai +
`
∑
j=1
Di j
)
. (4)
4Producing the same classification requires c(x(e)) = c(x), or, equivalently,
sgn
(
log
p(c = 0)
p(c = 1)
+
n
∑
i=1
log(αi/βi)
)
= sgn
(
log
p(c = 0)
p(c = 1)
+
n
∑
i=1
Ai +
`
∑
j=1
Di j
)
. (5)
Without loss of generality, fix the noiseless classifier output to c = 0, so that the sign function value is positive1. Next, write
T := −
(
log
p(c = 0)
p(c = 1)
+
n
∑
i=1
Ai
)
.
Here, T represents a target value. Then, the equality (5) is equivalent to
`
∑
j=1
Di j > T (6)
Recall that the Di j correspond to all the components in e that are equal to 1. Then, to sum over all e in (3), we must
determine all the subsets of {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn} with sum greater than the target T. A subset of size ` corresponds to an error
vector with ` feature bit errors that does not change the classification relative to the noiseless version. Such a subset contributes
a term (given by (3)) to the same classification probability.
Example: Consider a model with n = 3 binary features and equal error probability  = (,,). Take D1 + D2 > T.
This implies that the error vector e = (1, 1, 0) does not change the classification output, contributing a probability term of
2(1−) to the SCP.
IV. SCP APPROXIMATION
In this section, we consider issues surrounding the computation of the SCP. Our main result is an efficient SCP approximation.
A. Exact Empirical SCP
The problem described by (6) is a variant of the subset sum problem with real numbers. The naı¨ve approach is to enumerate
the 2n subsets of {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn} and compute each of their sums. This task is not tractable for large n.
A compact representation of the SCP is the function
G(z) =
n
∏
i=1
((1−i) +izDi )
We define [> T]G(z) to be the sum of the coefficients of terms in G(z) with exponent larger than T. It is easy to see that
SCP(x, E) = [> T]G(z).
Any subset {Di1 ,Di2 , . . . ,Di j} with sum greater than T produces a term in G(z) with exponent Di1 + . . .+ Di j > T and
coefficient
i1i2 · · ·i j ∏
i 6=i1 ,...,i j
(1−i).
The sum of all such coefficients is indeed the SCP. This may lead us to attempt to expand the function G(z) and examine the
resulting coefficients. However, the fact that the exponents are real-valued prevents us from doing so efficiently.
B. Quantization
Observe that if the exponents of terms in G(z) were non-negative integers, G(z) would be a polynomial, allowing for fast
multiplication. In fact, G(z) would become a generating function [33]. Inspired by this notion, we introduce the following
quantization scheme.
The key idea is to quantize Di into k buckets, for k a constant. By performing the quantization in a clever way, we induce
a structure that enables us to approximate the SCP in no more than O(n2 log n) operations. The approximation is described
in Algorithm 1; the concept is detailed below.
Our quantization scheme only relies on the minimal and maximal values of {D1, . . . ,Dn}. Let Dmin = min{D1, . . . ,Dn}
and Dmax = max{D1, . . . ,Dn}. Let DI = Dmax − Dmin. Consider the family of k intervals
1If the noiseless classifier output is c = 1, the outcome is that we seek subsets whose sum is less than the target value T rather than greater. All of the
arguments we present in this paper are unchanged. For simplicity of notation, we do not add the case to our setup.
5Algorithm 1 SCP Approximation
Input: Difference terms D1,D2, . . . ,Dn, Error probabilities 1,2, . . . ,n, Target T, Number of buckets in quantization
scheme k
Output: SCP approximation SCPapp
Initialize S1, . . . , Sk to 0, SCPapp to 0
for j = 1 to n do
if D j ∈ [Ebegini , Eendi ) then
Si ← Si + 1
iSi ←  j
end if
end for
expand G[i, j] = ∏ki=1∏
Si
j=1((1−i j) +i jyzi)
for i = 0 to n do
T′ ← k−1DI
(
T− i
(
Dmin − DIk−1
))
for j > 0 do
if G[i, j] > T′ then
SCPapp ← SCPapp + G[i, j]
end if
end for
end for
[
Dmin − DI2(k− 1) ,Dmin +
DI
2(k− 1)
)
,
[
Dmin +
DI
2(k− 1) ,Dmin +
3DI
2(k− 1)
)
, . . . ,[
Dmin +
(2k− 5)DI
2(k− 1) ,Dmin +
(2k− 3)DI
2(k− 1)
)
,
[
Dmin +
(2k− 3)DI
2(k− 1) ,Dmax +
(2k− 1)DI
2(k− 1)
)
. (7)
Note that each bucket has width Di/(k− 1). For compactness, we also write the ith interval as [Ebegini , Eendi ).
We quantize any value of D j that falls into a bucket with the midpoint of the bucket interval. We compute Si, the number
of D j in each bucket:
Si =
∣∣∣∣{D j : D j ∈ [Dmin + (2i− 3)DI2(k− 1) ,Dmin + (2i− 1)DI2(k− 1)
)
, 1 6 j 6 n
}∣∣∣∣ ,
for 1 6 i 6 k. In addition, we re-label the noise parameters such that i1,i2, . . . ,iSi are the noise parameters corresponding
to the features D j that fall into the ith bucket.
Recall that we seek to determine the subsets of {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn} that have sum greater than T. We approximate any D j
that falls into the ith interval with the midpoint of that interval:
Dmin +
i− 1
k− 1DI . (8)
Additionally, observe that Dmin and Dmax falls are represented by their own values.
We approximate the SCP by computing the SCP on the quantized versions of the Di; we show that this can be performed
efficiently by Algorithm 1.
Consider the multivariate generating function
G(y, z) =
k
∏
i=1
Si
∏
j=1
((1−i j) +i jyzi). (9)
We write [`,> R]G(y, z) for the sum of all coefficients of terms with exponent ` in y and exponent greater than R in z. Note
that in the case where  = (, . . . ,), G(y, z) reduces to
G(y, z) =
k
∏
i=1
((1−) +yzi)Si .
We show that the appropriate coefficients in the generating function yield the SCP for the quantized versions of the Di:
6Theorem 1. Under the quantization scheme given by Algorithm 1, the resulting SCP is given by
SCPapp(x, E) =
n
∑`
=0
[`,> T′(`)]G(y, z),
where
T′(`) := k− 1
DI
(
T− `
(
Dmin − DIk− 1
))
.
Proof: Consider some subset with size ` and sum greater than the target T in the quantization scheme given by (7).
We distribute our ` choices of D j into the k buckets, where we may take up to Si values from bucket i. Let (a1, a2, . . . , ak)
be such a choice; ai, for 0 6 ai 6 Si represents the number of D j falling into the ith bucket. A subset of size ` requires
a1 + a2 + . . .+ ak = `. The total sum for the subset is given by
a1Dmin + a2
(
Dmin +
DI
k− 1
)
+ . . .+ akDmax.
Here we used the fact that terms in each bucket are quantized to the midpoint of that bucket (i.e., expression (8)).
Since the sum of the subset is greater than T, we may write
(a1 + a2 + . . .+ ak)
(
Dmin − DIk− 1
)
+
(
a1
DI
k− 1 + a2
2DI
k− 1 + . . .+ ak
kDI
k− 1
)
> T
=⇒ `
(
Dmin − DIk− 1
)
+
DI
k− 1 (a1 + 2a2 + . . .+ kak) > T
=⇒ a1 + 2a2 + . . .+ kak > k− 1DI
(
T− `
(
Dmin − DIk− 1
))
:= T′.
Now we relate the generating function given in (9) to the equation a1 + 2a2 + . . .+ kak > T′. The generating function is
the product of n binomials. To generate a term in the expansion, we select from each binomial either 1−i j or i jyzi. The
subsets of size ` satisfying a1 + 2a2 + . . .+ kak > T′ correspond to choosing a1 terms 1 jyz, a2 terms 2 jyz2, and so on.
The products of such terms have degree ` in y and degree a1 + 2a2 + . . .+ kak > T′ in z. Considering the subsets of size
0, 1, . . . , n, we indeed have that SCPapp(x, E) = ∑n`=0[`,> T
′]G(y, z).
C. Computation
To compute SCPapp(x, E), we must perform the expansion of the generating function G(y, z) = ∏ki=1∏
Si
j=1((1−i j) +
i jyzi) and examine the coefficients. Polynomial multiplication is equivalent to convolution (of vectors or arrays, depending
on whether the polynomials are univariate or multivariate); this effort can be sped up by using the Fast Fourier Transform (fft)
[34]. In the Fourier domain, convolution is equivalent to multiplication. That is, for two polynomials q(x), r(x),
q(x)r(x) = ifft(fft(q)× fft(r)),
where the multiplication on the right side is performed term by term and ifft denotes the inverse transform. If the maximum
degree of q(x) and r(x) is d, the number of operations required is O(d log d).
First, we expand the terms ∏Sij=1((1−i j) +i jyzi). Replace yzi by v; then, we are multiplying Si polynomials of degree
1. This can be performed in O(Si log log Si) operations. This fact is not difficult to check: our Si monomials can be paired up
and the pairs multiplied; the Si/2 resulting degree-2 polynomials are paired up, and so on. The total time is O(S1 log log S1)+
O(S2 log log S2) + . . .+O(Sk log log Sk) 6 O(n log log n). We note that each expansion can be performed in parallel.
Note that in the case of identical , the polynomial to be expanded is ((1−)+yzi)Si , and the expansion can be performed
in O(Si) operations with the binomial theorem.
Next, each of the resulting expansions must be multiplied. The expansion of ∏Sij=1((1−i j) +i jyzi) can be represented
as a two-dimensional array, where rows represent the exponent of y and columns the exponent of z. In our case, we have k
arrays. The maximal degree for y is n, while the maximal degree for z is kn, so that the product of all of the arrays (and thus
any intermediate multiplication) has size at most n× kn. Each multiplication has cost at most O(kn2 log(kn)); the total cost
is thus no more than O(k2n2 log(kn)). (Again, it is possible to speed to perform the multiplications in parallel for speedup.)
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Fig. 2. SCP approximation error (against the real SCP) for the two approximation schemes. The parameters here are  = 10−2 and n = 16. 50 data points
were selected randomly; the true SCP was computed and the average absolute error was measured for various k in the two schemes.
D. Approximation Quality
Next we comment on the quality of the approximation. Clearly, the quality is a function of the number of buckets k; the
larger the k, the finer the approximation. We note, however, that the approximation error is not a monotonic function, since
there are edge effects for different k, as can be seen in Figure 2.
We introduce two improvements to optimize the worst-case error of the SCP approximation. We describe these errors as a
function of the noise parameter , and for simplicity take the case where all the components equal to . The first improvement
comes at no extra cost and reduces the worst-case error to O(2), while the second improvement requires O(nr) time but
reduces the worst-case error to O(r+1). We adopt the first improvement for our experiments.
Improvement 1. For the first improvement, consider the intervals defined in (7). If our target value T lines somewhere in
[Dmin,Dmax], we can translate (shift) all of our intervals over by some constant Tshi f t that is no larger than half an interval
width, DI/2(k− 1), such that T is now precisely the edge between two intervals. Then, any Di < T is mapped to a bucket
center smaller than T, while any Di > T is mapped to a bucket center larger than T. We conclude that any single-element
subset of {D1, . . . ,Dn} that contributes to the SCP also contributes to the SCP approximation; thus, all SCP approximation
errors must be for two- or more element subsets, reducing this error to O(2).
Improvement 2. We refer to the second improvement as a hybrid SCP approximation. The idea here is simple: we use the
approximation only for the subsets of size greater than r for some constant 2 6 r < n. For those subsets that are of size r
or smaller, we check the sums using the actual values of Di, requiring at most O(nr) time. This strategy is most suitable for
very small values of r, such as r = 2.
Example. An evaluation was performed on the small data set house-votes-84 from the UCI repository [35]. This set has
n = 16 binary features corresponding to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ votes on various congressional proposals; the binary class represents
democrat or republican. The small size of n enables us to compute the real SCP value (though much slower than the approximate
SCP). Figure 2 shows the error versus the true SCP for the two approximation schemes and various k averaged over 50 random
test points; the noise parameter was  = 10−2.
V. OPTIMIZED CHANNEL CODING
Thus far we have only considered the impact of noise without taking any action to protect the algorithm output from
distortion. In this section, we consider a simple but effective form of error correction. Our goal is to tailor this strategy to the
characteristics of the features in order to minimize the classifier distortion. This is a departure from traditional error protection,
which is typically present in a different abstraction layer and is agnostic to the algorithm.
Consider storing multiple copies of a certain feature bit; these copies are produced when the data is written and before the
addition of noise. Afterwards, when the bit is ready to be used, the repeated values of the bit (some of which may now be
corrupted) are subject to a majority vote (equivalent to maximum-likelihood decoding) and the decoded value is placed back
into the algorithm.
What is the effect of repetition on the error probability ? If the jth feature x j, corrupted by a bit flip with probability ,
is repeated 2r+ 1 times for some r > 0, the probability (r) that the feature is decoded incorrectly is equal to the probability
8Algorithm 2 Channel Code Optimization
Input: Test points x1, x2 . . . , xt, Noise vector  = (, . . . ,), redundancy budget r
Output: Optimized redundancy allocation vector rr
Initialize r(0) to 0
for j = 0 to r− 1 do
i← argmini 1t ∑ti=1 SCPapp(xt, Er( j)+1(i)))
r( j+ 1)← r( j) + 1(i)
end for
that the majority of votes are corrupted:
(r) =
2r+1
∑
i=r+1
(
2r+ 1
i
)
i(1−)2r+1−i .
For example, if r = 1, the smallest meaningful repetition, (1) = 3 + 32(1 − ). Note that we always add pairs of
repetitions, since an even number of repeated bits can produce ties. In general, employing r pairs of repeated bits drives the
error probability  to O(1+r).
A. Monotonicity
Intuitively, we expect that reducing the error probability on features will increase the SCP. Clearly, reducing all of the i to
0 yields an SCP of 1, as the only non-zero term in the SCP is (1−1)(1−2)× . . .× (1−n) = 1.
Nevertheless, the SCP does not necessarily increase when we reduce noise parameters . The following result is applicable
to both the SCP and the SCP approximation:
Theorem 2. Let x be a feature vector and  = (1, . . . ,i−1,i ,i+1, . . . ,n) and ′ = (1, . . . ,i−1,′i ,i+1, . . . ,n) be noise
parameter vectors with i > ′i Let the associated error vectors be E, E′, respectively. If Di > 0, then SCP(x, E) > SCP(x, E′),
while if Di 6 0, then SCP(x, E) 6 SCP(x, E′).
Proof: Every summand in SCP(x, E) is either a multiple of i (if it corresponds to a subset of the D js that includes Di)
or a multiple of (1−i) (if it corresponds to a subset of the D j that does not include Di). We write
SCP(x, E) = iC1 + (1−i)C2,
where C1,C2 are non-negative.
Case 1) Di > 0. Consider the subsets of {D1, . . . ,Dn} \ {Di}. corresponding to C1. These subsets must have sum larger
than T−Di, since including Di, their sum must exceed T. In the case of C2, these subsets have sum larger than T. Since Di
is positive, any subset with sum larger than T has sum larger than T − Di as well, so all subsets corresponding to C2 also
correspond to terms in C1. We may write C1 = C2 + C3 for some C3 > 0. Then,
SCP(x, E) = iC1 + (1−i)C2
= i(C2 + C3) + (1−i)C2
= C2 +iC3.
Since C3 > 0, reducing i to ′i reduces the SCP as well.
Case 2) Di 6 0. Then, T− Di > T, so all subsets corresponding to C1 also correspond to C2. Thus, we can write
SCP(x, E) = iC1 + (1−i)C2
= iC1 + (1−i)(C1 + C3)
= C1 + (1−i)C3.
Reducing i to ′i increases (1−i)C3, so the SCP is increased.
In words, noise helps the SCP when applied to those features that disagree with the classification, since flipping these bits
increases confidence (and can cover up for other bit flips that reduce it). However, noise hurts the SCP when applied to features
that agree with the classification; the sign of Di is a direct consequence of this idea.
The fact that reducing the error probability (by adding redundancy, etc.) is not always helpful leads us to seek an optimized
solution. Clearly a uniform allocation of protection for all features is not always a good idea.
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR CLASSIFICATION CHANGE PROBABILITY (1-SCP)
Movie dataset, feature set 1 Movie dataset, feature set 2 Voting dataset NLTCS dataset
R Uniform Optimal Ratio Uniform Optimal Ratio Uniform Optimal Ratio Rb Optimal No protection
1 0.10112 0.08664 1.1670 0.1263 0.10245 1.2328 0.05635 0.04135 1.3628 6 0.0131 0.0218
2 0.03484 0.03024 1.1524 0.04419 0.03028 1.4595 0.03182 0.02377 1.3390 7 0.0120 0.0218
3 0.01154 0.01002 1.1513 0.01469 0.00879 1.6711 0.01903 0.01429 1.3319 8 0.0108 0.0218
4 0.00382 0.00331 1.1535 0.00486 0.00256 1.9028 0.01154 0.0085 1.3555 9 0.0097 0.0218
5 0.00127 0.00109 1.1576 0.00162 0.00077 2.1019 0.00702 0.00504 1.3911 10 0.0086 0.0218
6 0.00043 0.00037 1.1602 0.00055 0.00024 2.2549 0.00423 0.00298 1.4328 11 0.0074 0.0218
7 0.00015 0.00013 1.1622 0.00019 7.70E-05 2.3983 0.00261 0.00177 1.4742 12 0.0062 0.0218
8 4.94E-05 4.24E-05 1.1636 6.30E-05 2.48E-05 2.539 0.0016 0.00105 1.5182 13 0.0052 0.0218
9 1.69E-05 1.45E-05 1.1646 2.16E-05 8.08E-06 2.6720 0.00098 0.00063 1.5632 14 0.0044 0.0218
10 5.83E-06 5.00E-06 1.1654 7.43E-06 2.64E-06 2.8109 0.00060 0.00038 1.6107 15 0.0037 0.0218
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Fig. 3. Classification change probability (1− SCP) for a movie reviews data set with n = 20 features and a test set of size of t = 250. Comparison of the
results of optimized versus uniform redundancy allocation.
B. Greedy Optimization
In the remainder of this work, we introduce an algorithm to optimize the allocation of a redundancy budget for coded feature
protection. We use a budget of 2r redundancy bits, which will be used to protect our n features. Feature i is then represented by
i+ 2ri copies, and has error probability (ri), for 1 6 i 6 n. The noise vector for all n features (r) = ((r1),(r2), . . . ,(rn)).
The corresponding error vector is written E(r). The values r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) are constrained by r1 + r2 + . . .+ rn = r. To
minimize the distortion due to noise on point x, we must maximize the SCP with respect to r and the resulting  vector. We
have the following optimization
argmax
r
SCP(x, E(r)) s.t.
n
∑
i=1
ri = r, ri > 0.
Our first step is to perform a tractable version of this optimization using our SCP approximation:
argmax
r
SCPapp(x, E(r)) s.t.
n
∑
i=1
ri = r, ri > 0.
Although we can now efficiently check each value of r, doing so is still computationally expensive. The number of solutions
to r1 + r2 + . . .+ rn = r with ri > 0 is given by (n+r−1r ). We turn to a greedy (myopic) optimization approach to further
reduce the complexity. This approach enables us to perform the optimization one redundancy unit (two repeated bits) at a time.
After the jth step, we write the redundancy vector as r( j) = (r1( j), r2( j), . . . , rn( j)). In the ( j+ 1)st step, one of the ri( j)
terms is selected and increased by 1. For ease of notation, let us write 1(i) for the vector (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with a 1 in
the ith position and 0s elsewhere. Then, the ( j+ 1)st step is given by
argmax
i
SCPapp(x, Er( j)+1(i))) s.t. 1 6 i 6 n.
This reduces our complexity to that of performing n SCP computations per each of the r steps. Of course, we can also
perform the optimization over t test data points. The procedure is given in Algorithm 2
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Fig. 4. The classification change probability (uniform to optimized allocation) ratio reaches 3×. The setup is the same as that of Figure 2.
We demonstrate our approach with SCP experiments using the voting dataset [35], the movie review dataset from [36], and
the NLTCS dataset in [37]. In all cases, we used k = 50 for the number of buckets in our SCP approximations. For the movie
reviews set we used two sets of n = 20 features and 250 test data points. The  parameter was 0.2 for the first 2 datasets (a
very high amount of noise that can nevertheless be handled through channel coding). Table II shows the classification change
(1− SCP) probability for uniform and optimized assignment of redundancy bits given a budget of 2nR bits. We report the
ratio of the classification change probability (uniform versus optimized); this ratio reaches up to 3×.
In the movie review dataset, the first feature set included features with similar dependence on the class variable. The second
feature set included a mixture of features (some more informative of the class variable than others). In this case the optimized
assignment has a clear benefit over the uniform assignment. The results on the voting dataset (using n = 16 features and
t = 454 test data points) are in between those of the two movie review sets. A plot of the SCP and the improvement ratio for
the more beneficial assignment is shown in Figures 3 and 4.
For the NLTCS dataset, we tested the case of a small amount of redundancy Rb 6 15, so that a uniform allocation is
impossible, and we must rely on the optimization. Here, n = 15 features and t = 3236 test data points were used. The results
are compared to the unprotected version.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied binary naı¨ve Bayes classifiers operating on noisy test data. First, we characterized the impact of bit flips due to
noise on the classifier output with the same classification probability (SCP). We introduced a low-complexity approximation
for the SCP based on quantization and polynomial multiplication. Next, we considered minimizing the classifier distortion by
allocating redundant bits among the features. Our informed approached for redundancy allocation is among the first principled
methods combining coding theory with machine learning. We demonstrated the results of this idea with experiments.
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